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THESIS SUMMARY
Insurance and hedging instruments can help corporations manage many of the operational
and financial risks they face. Yet, additional complexities are introduced now that many risks are
increasingly interdependent and thus strongly correlated, making them more challenging to
manage. Few risks illustrate this challenge better than cyber risk.
This thesis will focus on the increasing attention that the management of cyber risks
receives in corporations, institutions and industries, and the role that insurance and risk
management strategies play in mitigating this risk. The decision to focus on cyber risks—and the
financing and management of those risks—is directly related to the exponential increase in cyber
threats throughout the global economy. Thirty years ago, few would have predicted the
magnitude of damage that cyber-attacks would routinely inflict upon organizations of all sizes—
with the potential for far more severe losses looming ever larger. The rapid evolution and
escalation of cyber threats—along with their ubiquitous nature—has led to a comprehensive
reassessment of how organizations manage risks of all types. Insurers have been meeting the
changing risk management needs of these organizations through innovations in product design,
which now commonly include elements of loss control and post-event mitigation—in addition to
traditional loss financing.
This thesis begins with a historical review of cyber threats and proceeds to examine the
varied nature of cyber threats impacting several key industries. Data on major attacks for each
industry examined in this thesis were researched, collected and analyzed, and are displayed in the
database included in the appendix to this paper. For the discussion of early-stage cyber threats, I
will trace the evolution of cyber threats from relatively simplistic denial-of-service attacks, to
early computer viruses, to phishing emails, and to the multiplicity of sophisticated threats seen
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today, such as ransomware. The objective is to provide those who are unfamiliar with cyber risk
(i.e., students or other professionals) with an increased awareness of the threats, as well as an
understanding of how organizations can mitigate such threats.
INTRODUCTION
Cyber-attacks can have long lasting impacts for organizations and companies. The
financial consequences are potentially substantial—both in terms of direct costs to manage the
consequences of the attack as well as a company’s share price. Cyber-attacks can also negatively
impact a company’s reputation with the public and customers. In the case of healthcare, for
example, individuals want assurance that their personal and private information is protected; any
actual or perceived cyber threat against a healthcare institution will jeopardize the presumption
of privacy and may lead clients to seek healthcare elsewhere.
Vulnerability to cyber risks is increasing exponentially. Digitization and
interconnectedness are proceeding at a pace that is faster than what can be realistically managed.
The rapid progression and evolution of cyber risks are central themes of this thesis. Specifically,
I will analyze past examples of cyber-attacks for trends in each of three significantly impacted
industries: healthcare, transportation, and electoral systems. The research will examine
vulnerabilities among organizations affected by these attacks. Cyber risk management protocols
in place at the time of the attacks will be assessed to ascertain the degree and nature of
vulnerabilities. Opportunities for enhancing cyber risk management will also be identified.
HISTORY OF CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER RISK
The rapid evolution, spread, and dependence on digital technologies over the past 25
years has resulted in an exponential increase in cyber risk. Management of cyber risks is now a
C-suite and board level issue, with an increasingly sophisticated portfolio of cyber insurance
4

products playing a key role in managing that risk. Cyber insurance has been available since the
late 1970s, though few organizations took advantage of it. “Following Y2K, the dotcom crash
and the 9/11 attacks, interest in cyber insurance grew. There was a growing realization that the
virtual world did not necessarily fit within the scope of many traditional covers/classes of
insurance” [1].
How Y2K Changed Cyber Risk
In the late 1990s, Y2K and the dotcom boom were the primary drivers of increasing
awareness of cyber risk and the dangers of interconnectivity of networks. In the article, “The
Y2K Problem: Social Chaos or Social Transformation?”, explicit fear was expressed by the
author, John L. Peterson, a futurist specializing in long-range security implications of a rapidly
changing world. Writing in 1998, Peterson’s article examines societal apprehensions near the
turn of the millennium. Peterson describes the panic that ensued in the population over the
perception that the year 2000 might cause chaos for computer systems, despite the seemingly
innocuous root of the problem. Since the dawn of the computer age in the mid-twentieth century
and for decades thereafter, computer algorithms created by software engineers utilized a twodigit (rather than four digit) date format (i.e., 1960 was denoted as “60”), and many feared the
systems would not have the ability to properly interpret the year 2000 [2]. Peterson further
asserted at the time that “the year 2000 computer problem could create chaos on an order of
magnitude we have never seen. Without a spirit of cooperation, we may all suffer” [3].
The turn of the millennium was an important time in history, because while cyber risks
were clearly in existence prior to Y2K, mounting concerns over Y2K beginning in the late 1990s
represent a reasonable historical starting point for the analysis of cyber risks. This is because the
Y2K period was when this risk first became universally recognized as a societal and economic
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threat. It is also important to point out that there was increasing recognition that the world had
become interdependent on technology. “It is that interconnectedness that threatens us if we do
not match it with the deeper interconnectedness of human beings and communities” [3]. The
interconnectivity of systems created a terrifying scenario, because no single system could protect
itself. In the past, many companies operated their own proprietary networks; if one company was
hacked, then that became an isolated issue which needed to be resolved. Y2K revealed that cyber
risks are a systemic risk, potentially leading to cascading failures capable of crippling basic
infrastructure and threatening the economy in general.
The Interconnectivity of Systems
Today, most companies are connected—directly or indirectly— to their suppliers,
vendors, customers, and many other entities and organizations—including some with poor cyber
risk management protocols or worse, actual malicious intent. Connectivity brings convenience to
users, but with that convenience comes an elevated risk. This interconnectivity—frequently
referred to as the “Internet of Things” or IoT—has led to risk management issues so large that it
has become increasingly necessary and prudent for companies to purchase a separate cyber
insurance policy to cover the losses that can arise [4].
The Rise of Cyber Insurance
Early cyber insurance policies began to gain traction with businesses as a stand-alone
product in response to Y2K concerns. Such insurance was needed to fill gaps in traditional
property and casualty products [1]. Cyber insurance generally covers business’ liability for data
breaches involving sensitive customer information, such as credit card numbers, social security
numbers, and health records. Cyber insurance also helps with repairing damaged computer
systems, recovering compromised data, and notifying clients of the data breach [5]. Privacy
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regulation in the U.S. in the early 2000s served as an additional catalyst fueling increased
demand for cyber insurance. Increasingly frequent mass data breaches—coupled with greater
media attention and public concern to the issue resulted in pressure for regulation. A flurry of
legislative actions ensued. California was at the vanguard of this regulatory movement with the
passage of one of the nation’s first breach notification laws, which became effective on July 1,
2003. “Other states followed, mandating that companies had to immediately disclose a breach to
customers, usually in writing in addition to the regulatory authorities” [1]. Cyber insurance
products shifted in response to these new notification requirements toward compensating the
costs associated with major data breaches, including the costs of notifying customers and
regulators. The market quickly gained momentum in the U.S. as notification rules expanded
across multiple sectors and states. As major breaches began to make headlines with ever
increasing frequency, the demand for cyber insurance grew and the market took off [1]. And as
cyber-attacks become more damaging, institutions were searching for cyber coverage to protect
themselves from these risks.
The increase in frequency and severity of cyber-attacks underscores the important role of
insurance in managing and mitigating risks. High-profile cases, such as the 2013 Target data
breach, 2017 Equifax data breach, and the leak of Democratic National Committee emails during
the 2016 election made national headlines [6]. Indeed, organizations across all industries are
extremely likely to be the victim of a cyber-attack. Willis Towers Watson, one of the world’s
largest insurance brokers, in its 2019 Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2 reported that over 32%
of businesses experienced a cyber-attack within the past year [7]. Cyber insurance can help
companies by providing teams with expertise in responding to cyber incidents. According to
Willis Towers Watson, cyber insurance can also help foster a dialogue within an organization:
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“The application, underwriting, and renewal process can help open up needed conversation
among an organization’s key leaders about how to best mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. This
process — which involves questions, advice, and input from a company’s broker and
underwriter(s) — quickly highlights critical cyber gaps” [8]. Once these gaps are identified, they
can be analyzed for companies to make investments in cybersecurity that can help to prevent the
potential loss.
The Cyber Insurance Solution
One of the major issues with cybersecurity is the lack of awareness. Many senior
corporate executives are unaware of the risk and the extent of potential business impacts and
legal exposure cyber-attacks produce. “Recent publications by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security and several industry entities report significant increases in the number of
cyber-attacks against industrial control systems. The sophistication of attacks is also increasing
as is the likelihood that they will be physically destructive and cause significant loss” [9]. It is
crucial that organizations of all sizes act proactively and create a cyber-risk plan, rather than
waiting until after an attack. In addition to the lack of awareness, many institutions are not taking
advantage of cyber insurance offerings. Looking at the cyber insurance take-up rates for Marsh
clients in Figure 1, it is apparent that there are gaps in the cyber insurance market, with the
overall take-up rate for 2019 being only 42% [10]. The take-up rate is the percentage of all
Marsh clients that purchased the coverage. Although fewer than half of Marsh clients purchased
cyber insurance in 2019, trends in recent years suggest organizations have a heightened
appreciation of the risk. From 2017 to 2019, across all industries the take-up rate increased by
11 percentage points from 31% to 42%. Notably, the take-up rate is more than twice the 19%
recorded in 2014.

8

Take-up rates vary substantially across industries (see Figure 2 [10]). Note that Education
was the leading buyer of cyber insurance in 2019 with a 74% take-up rate. Healthcare was a
close second with a 65% take-up rate. The strong demand for coverage is a reflection of the
significant exposure to loss of personally identifiable information (PPI) and protected health
information (PHI) across the educational and healthcare sectors.
The average cost of a data breach varies per industry, with healthcare being the leader.
Figure 3 [11] displays the average total cost of a data breach by industry. The 2019 study was
conducted by the Ponemon Institute and the results were analyzed by IBM Security. The results
are based on a sample of 507 companies [11]. Again, in this study, healthcare was the leading
industry at an average per data breach being $6.45 million. Health, financial, and energy
companies are subject to more stringent regulation than industries such as media, hospitality, and
retail. The increased regulations make these industries more susceptible to higher costs per
breach.
Figure 1: US Cyber Insurance Take-up Rates (Marsh Clients) [10]
45%

42%
38%

40%
35%

31%

30%

26%

25%
20%

22%
19%

15%
10%
5%
0%
2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

9

Figure 2: US Cyber Insurance Take-up Rates by Industry [10]
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Figure 3: Average Total Cost of a Data Breach by Industry [11]
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CYBER RISK IN THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR

The digitization of health records has made many aspects of healthcare administration
and delivery more efficient, reducing costs and increasing accessibility, but it has also
dramatically increased the exposure of the healthcare sector to cyber-attacks and data breaches.
The late 2000s experienced a shift from theft of physical records to hacking of personal and
medical information within technology systems. There is a vast amount of data regarding data
breaches within healthcare organizations. Based on the data collected for this study, breaches
such as email phishing attacks, malware attacks, ransomware attacks, and other various types of
hacking methods frequently employed to target healthcare organizations. Despite measures that
providers have in place to prevent data breaches, “…89% of healthcare organizations
experienced a data breach in the past two years” [12]. Our analysis of the healthcare sector
reveals much of the industry’s exposed data is related to personal patient information. This
information includes, but is not limited to: names, addresses, dates of birth, social security
numbers, insurance contract information and numbers, debit and credit card information, phone
numbers, and medical information.
The Digitization of the Healthcare Industry

The computerization of the healthcare industry overall has increased productivity, which
has at the same time increased reliance on technology. In one of the biggest healthcare data
breaches of 2020, Universal Health Services (UHS), one of the largest health networks in the
United States, was affected at all of their U.S. sites and hospitals. Specifically, on September 27,
2020, the UHS experienced a ransomware attack which locked company computers and phone
systems across the country. The suspected cybercriminals used a strain of ransomware known as

11

Ryuk [13]. Due to this attack, doctors and nurses were forced “to rely on paper and pencil for
record keeping and slowing lab work. Employees described chaotic conditions impeding patient
care” [14]. This major attack displays the consequences that cyber-attacks can have on
productivity and operations.

The privacy of healthcare information has long been a concern of consumers. The
Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) enacted in 1996—well before
the widespread digitization of personal health information—provides for stringent safeguarding
of such information. HIPAA remains to this day the single most important piece of federal
legislation governing health information privacy concerns. The law requires that personal health
care information must be protected. In 2009, the law further evolved with the passage of the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) under the
Obama administration. HITECH imposed financial penalties for violations of HIPAA which
increased the cost of HIPAA noncompliance [15]. Sensitivity associated with the compromise of
health information is evident in the expensive settlements of healthcare sector cyber-attacks,
such as in the 2016 Banner Health cyberattack in which an $8.9 million settlement was paid.

The sheer size of the healthcare sector (nearly 20 percent of the GDP in 2020), the trend
toward digitization of medical records, and the rapid evolution of medical technology are just
three of many factors that attract the attention of cyber criminals. Despite many attacks in recent
years, the healthcare sector remains highly susceptible to debilitating cyber-attacks.
Issues in Common Healthcare Cybersecurity Practices
The healthcare industry is known to have had some of the “worst cybersecurity practices
worldwide” [16]. This analysis of healthcare sector data breaches strongly suggests a systemic
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problem with data and system security throughout this major economic sector. Violations of
privacy statutes and allegations of negligence in the wake of data breaches have led to litigation,
in which class-action lawsuits for large settlements were filed based on accusations that the
companies involved failed to implement reasonable security protocols. These settlements were so
substantial because of both the number of patients or records involved and the type of data that
was exposed. Healthcare data breaches tend to be extremely costly due to the sensitivity of the
exposed data. In the “2020 IBM Report, the average cost of a data breach reported that the most
expensive attacks in 2019 occurred in the healthcare sector” [17]. The data that hospitals hold is
much more profitable compared to other industries. Healthcare credentials are even “more
valuable than credit card information when sold on the dark web” [18]. The danger in the
healthcare sector is that a hacker could potentially use one’s identity for years once a certain
amount of personally identifiable information is obtained through healthcare data breaches.

Based on our dataset, it is apparent that healthcare organizations both large and small are
targeted. There has been a steady increase in the number of healthcare data breaches each year.
Figure 4 shows the number of breaches involving 500 or more records from 2009 to November
2020 [19 & 20].
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Figure 4: Healthcare Data Breaches of 500 or More Records per Year [19& 20]

510

275
199

200

215

2010

2011

2012

310

329

357

371

2017

2018

544

270

18
2009

2013

2014

2015

2016

2019

2020

Note: These are data breaches of 500 or more healthcare records reported to the Department of Health and
Human Services' Office for Civil Rights by HIPAA-covered entities and business associates.
*2020 is through November 2020

Victims range from large for-profit organizations to small nonprofits. Small healthcare
organizations may arguably be a more attractive target, because small providers are still
struggling with cybersecurity and frequently do not have the human or financial resources
necessary to keep pace with state-of-the art governance and risk management strategies. Small
providers struggle with even the most remedial of security protocols such as multi-factor
authentication (MFA), “…with just half of those providers implementing MFA to shore-up
potential vulnerabilities” [21].
Multi-Factor Authentication Protection

Multi-factor authentication adds an additional layer of protection against one of the most
common breaches - compromised credentials [22]. Multi-factor authentication helps to insulate
an organization against remote attacks and can prevent hackers from easily gaining access to
sensitive data. When paired with employee training, multi-factor authentication is even more
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effective. With a “push” notification, MFA authentication requests a verification code (often via
text message or email) in order to login. A trained employee would easily be able to recognize
activity as suspicious if they have not recently attempted to log into one of their accounts or
systems. According to ValiMail CEO Alexander Garcia-Tobar, “It only takes one click for a
person to endanger an entire enterprise” and “healthcare organizations are particularly vulnerable
to these attacks because awareness about email authentication is still quite low in the sector as a
whole” [23]. Small-to-medium sized healthcare providers frequently lack the resources to
implement and maintain robust cybersecurity systems. Worse still, many are overconfident in
their current risk management practices—or ignorant of their vulnerabilities. Such failures can
have significant financial consequences as evidenced by a spate of recent class action lawsuits
against healthcare providers filed in response to data breaches. The lawsuits allege negligence
on the part of those providers in that they failed to take reasonable steps to protect confidential
patient information. In the case of 21st Century Oncology, the company faced a $2.3 million
lawsuit with the court finding that it failed to implement security measures to reduce risks while
also failing to apply procedures to review information system activity regularly [24].

Along with the addition of multi-factor authentication, one of the most important aspects
of risk management that a healthcare organization can introduce is employee training. According
to Michael Bruemmer, vice president of Experian Data Breach Resolutions, 80% of the incidents
they serviced had basic employee negligence as a root cause. “That includes such mistakes as
losing laptops or clicking on phishing emails. ‘Employees are still the weakest link.’” [25].
Additionally, healthcare industry data breaches are commonly linked to theft and loss of laptops.
According to a Data Breach Investigations Report, in which 1,300 data breaches involving 20
industries were analyzed, “healthcare was the only industry that had theft and loss as a major

15

cause of security incidents” [26]. This accounted for 46% of the security incidents. This further
demonstrates that employee risk needs to be mitigated in order to help reduce cyber
vulnerabilities in the healthcare industry.
Sophistication: A Dynamic Threat

Cyber threats are dynamic, and the tools, techniques and strategies employed by those
with malicious intent are becoming increasingly sophisticated—and ever costlier to thwart.
According to a Ponemon Institute report, “For the 9th year in a row, healthcare organizations had
the highest cost of a breach – nearly $6.5 million on average (over 60% more than other
industries in the study)” [27]. This lofty cost is partly due to the exponential increase in digitized
health information and the fact that compromised health records can produce losses for years
after a breach. Identity theft is just one such example of potentially long-lived losses. The
nature and modality of cyber-attacks is also shifting. Ransomware attacks, for example, are
becoming increasingly common. The shift away from offline backups has made companies more
vulnerable to certain types of attack. According to Raimund Genes, CTO at Trend Micro:
“Ransomware attacks are surging because attackers have perfected their techniques while
enterprises in all sectors have failed to address critical security shortcomings” [28]. The ABCD
incident, that is explained in Appendix I, shows that even companies with advanced
cybersecurity in place can still become victims of ransomware attacks. While it is not “possible
to prevent all ransomware attacks, risk can be reduced to an acceptable level with cybersecurity
solutions and securely stored backups of data will ensure ransom demands will not have to be
paid” [29].
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The ever-increasing sophistication of cyber-attack strategies underscores the critical need
for healthcare organizations to implement multi-layered security systems and encryption to help
ensure that patient data cannot be accessed by unauthorized third parties [30]. This is particularly
crucial because the healthcare industry accounts for a large share of economic activity in the
United States. In 2019, health spending accounted for 17.7% of the nation’s gross domestic
product [31].

Our analysis of major cyber-attacks on the healthcare industry (see appendix) reveals that
a substantial proportion of healthcare organizations were not prepared when attacked. Even those
who believed they were prepared clearly underestimated the threat. There is no question that the
confidential health data of millions of Americans remains extremely vulnerable to cyber-attack
and employee negligence. Failure to mitigate against these risks is very costly. Consequently,
data security is one of the healthcare industry’s biggest concerns today and will remain as such
for the foreseeable future [32].
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR
Transportation networks are particularly vulnerable to cyber risks due to increased
digitization, vast amounts of data flowing across systems and the immediate impact disruptions
can have on travel and supply chains. As more systems and devices are connected—directly or
indirectly—the more vulnerable this industry becomes. Advances in communications across
electronic networks have caused the potential of disruption to become a serious concern. The
interconnected data systems of different branches of the transportation infrastructure including
automobiles, aviation, shipping, railways, and trucking compound the likelihood of cyber-attacks
causing significant interference and material economic disruption [33].
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In the automobile industry, software and electronic components are increasingly
prevalent in modern vehicles. According to McKinsey & Company, the software market for
vehicles “is expected to grow from USD 238 billion in 2020 to USD 469 billion in 2030,
corresponding to an annual growth of over 7 percent per year” [34]. This growth is driven by
innovation in four areas: autonomous cars, connectivity, electric cars, and car sharing. Various
studies have analyzed the cybersecurity threats to autonomous vehicles. In general, as the degree
of vehicle autonomy increases, the increased dependence on computerized control systems
increases vulnerability to hacking. “Without sufficient security, vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to
infrastructure communication channels can be hacked, which can lead to serious accidents” [35].
Autonomous Vehicles: An Evolving Risk
The market for autonomous vehicles is growing rapidly. “According to a new forecast
from International Data Corporation (IDC), the number of vehicles capable of at least Level 1
autonomy will increase from 31.4 million units in 2019 to 54.2 million units in 2024,
representing a five-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 11.5%” [36]. See Figure 5
below for a visualization of this information. The Level 1 autonomy described here is established
by the Society of Automotive Engineers and consists of “…driver assistance that may assist
active steering, breaking, or acceleration; however, the driver still remains responsible and in
control of the vehicle [36].
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Figure 5: Expected Growth for Autonomous Vehicles [36]
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The movement of car sales and customer data to online platforms makes the industry
increasingly susceptible to cyber-attacks. In 2019, 198 million car buyer records were exposed in
a massive data leak from a car buyer marketing database, DealerLeads. The database that
included names, email addresses, phone numbers, and street addresses, was found to be
insecurely posted online [37]. DealerLeads was able to password-protect the database once
notified, but the data had already been exposed. In reaction to the event, Jonathan Knudsen, a
senior security strategist at Synopsys, said “all that was needed was a simple policy that every
internet-facing system needs: password protection, data encryption, or other fundamental
protections” [37]. This breach highlights the necessity of an increase in security measures within
the automobile industry.
Cyber Risk in the Aviation Industry
Further, the aviation industry faces similar challenges and susceptibility. With the
proliferation of inflight wireless networks and other systems in recent years, an increasing
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number of aircraft—including large passenger aircraft carrying hundreds of passengers—are
today connected to the internet, which raises concerns over potential cyber-attacks. Overall,
commercial aircraft have never been safer. Technical advances have reduced the chances of an
accident, but much of the improvement in aviation safety is derived from the computerization of
flight systems, both internal and external to the aircraft. These computer systems are critical to
essential operations such as inflight control and navigation systems, air traffic control, and
passenger reservations. Marsh emphasizes, “As aircraft move ever closer to becoming fully eenabled and automation increases, pilot practices and training will need to adapt in the event of
system failure or security breach” [33]. In 2015, LOT Polish Airlines suffered a DDoS attack
which caused the airline's computers to crash. It also destroyed its flight plan IT system. This
resulted in a 5-hour disruption that saw 10 flight cancellations, 12 flight delays, and 1,400
passengers grounded. Flights midair were luckily unaffected [38]. Due to the loss of crucial
flight information, David Emm, principal security researcher at Kaspersky Lab postulates: “This
story highlights the fact that, as more and more aspects of our lives become cyber-dependent, we
offer a greater attack surface to cybercriminals – including critical infrastructure systems” [39].
There is no question that the aviation industry’s increasing dependence on globally
interconnected digital platforms will only amplify risks in the years ahead.
Cyber Risk in the Rail Industry
Comparably, Rail transportation IT systems require high levels of accessibility. Rail
infrastructure is particularly vulnerable due to multiple types of risks. One risk is that railway
driver assistance and control systems are highly interconnected. If these systems are infiltrated,
serious consequences could arise including loss of control of one or more trains [40].
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Transportation system vulnerabilities are present throughout the world and hackers need not be
sophisticated to be successful. The public transportation in Lodz, Poland, was attacked in 2008
when a “14-year-old modified a TV remote control so that it could be used to change track
points. The teenager broke into a number of tram depots to gather the information needed to
build the device, which turned the tram system in Lodz into his own personal train set. As a
result, four vehicles were derailed injuring twelve people” [33]. Other rail systems have been
attacked, such as the ransomware attack on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA) in October 2020. Hackers obtained personal information from workers for MBTA’s
commuter rail operator, Keolis, and posted it online in attempt to blackmail the company. Keolis
took the systems that were affected offline, notified law enforcement, and took steps to restore
the affected systems [41]. Ticketing, rail information systems and system websites represent
additional nodes of vulnerability because of the potential for customer financial information to
be exposed. Ticket validity is also a concern and websites are vulnerable to multitude of attack
modalities [40].
Cyber Risk in the Trucking Industry
Within the trucking industry, connected systems continue to grow. In October 2019, the
Volvo Group passed the milestone of one million connected customer assets in terms of
delivered trucks, buses, and construction equipment [42]. This connectivity is expected to
increase sustainability, uptime, and traffic safety. Connectivity is expected to continue to expand
exponentially. According to a McKinsey Global Institute discussion paper, Connected World: An
evolution in connectivity beyond the 5G revolution, citing a recent International Data
Corporation (IDC) estimate, “there could be up to 42 billion connected IoT devices by 2025”
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[43]. The more connected transportation networks become, the more vulnerable they are to cyber
risk.
Cyber Risk in the Freight Industry
Analogous to the trucking industry, the shipping industry is likewise vulnerable but on a
global scale. Ships utilize electronic navigation devices such as the Global Positioning System
(GPS) which if interfered with, can cause serious trouble for ship operators, increasing the
likelihood of crashing [44]. Additionally, maritime operations use millions of data points each
week, making it crucial for shipping lines to have this data stored securely [45]. In 2017, a cyberattack against Maersk, a global shipping company, disrupted operations for two weeks and cost
the company around $300 million. Maersk was hit by a worm named NotPetya, which locked
access to systems that the company uses to operate shipping terminals worldwide. No data was
lost, and ships operated normally throughout the period the systems were down. However, for up
to two days, the affected terminals could not move cargo, resulting in significant losses from
worldwide delays [46]. In order for maritime operators to mitigate attacks, they must have a
cybersecurity plan and take steps to strengthen firewalls to stop attacks like the Maersk attack
from happening [45].
Despite an evolving risk landscape, with cyber risk moving up the ladder, certain
companies are still choosing not to purchase cyber coverage. According to Aon’s 2019 Global
Risk Management Survey, less than half (44%) of the transportation service companies (nonaviation) purchased cyber insurance coverage, and 35% of companies had no plan of purchasing
cyber-insurance (See Figure 6). The aviation industry is better off, with 69% who have
purchased coverage and only 19% with no plans to purchase [47].
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Research and analysis reveal that transportation organizations of many different types
and sizes are targeted. Many of those attacked were not prepared at the time of the attack nor had
a plan in place of what to do after the initial attack. The development and implementation of
comprehensive cyber-risk management plans—plans which include the purchase of proper
insurance coverage—are critically important in the transportation sector given the extreme
interdependence of transportation risks with virtually every other major industry sectors.
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Figure 6: Purchase of Cyber Insurance Coverage by Industry [47]
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ELECTIONS
Elections are vulnerable to a wide variety of cybersecurity risks due to the rapid adoption
of and increasing reliance on digital election infrastructure. This vulnerability came to the
forefront in the United States for the first time during the 2008 presidential campaign and has
remained a consistent issue since then [48]. Specifically, during the 2008 presidential contest
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between Democrat Barack Obama and his Republican rival John McCain, the FBI uncovered a
massive cyberespionage operation against both campaigns. The operation was ultimately traced
back to the People's Republic of China. The goal of the campaign intrusion was thought to be to
export internal data from both campaigns. This included internal position papers and private
emails to gain leverage with the winner of the election. The intrusion into the campaign's
computer networks continued for months after first being detected by the FBI in the summer of
2008. The attack was initially delivered by a "phishing" email which contained an attachment
with sophisticated malware that infiltrated the Obama campaign's computer system [49]. This
malware allowed threat actors to exfiltrate data from both campaigns. This event was particularly
significant because it was the first time that a foreign actor had exfiltrated large quantities of
information from a United States presidential race for potential use by a foreign government
[50]. Fortunately, in the 2012 elections, there were no documented instances of digital foul play
or malicious hacking [51]. Although there was no concrete evidence of a hack from the 2012
election, that does not mean that the large potential threat was nonexistent. Indeed, it is possible
that infiltrations occurred but went undetected or were detected but not publicly revealed.
During the United States’ 2016 presidential election cycle, the Obama administration
accused Russia of interference. In a joint statement from the U.S. Intelligence Community and
the Department of Homeland Security, the agencies announced that “The U.S. Intelligence
Community is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of emails
from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. These thefts and
disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S. election process” [52]. Hackers created a fake
email account to send phishing emails to over 30 of Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton’s
staffers. The emails included a link that directed to a document titled "hillaryclinton-favorable-
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rating.xlsx". This led to a website operated by the hackers where they were able to use stolen
credentials to access the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee network and steal
data. They accessed 33 Democratic National Committee (DNC) computers and registered for a
website called ‘DC leaks’ to publicize the documents [53]. Special Counsel Robert Mueller,
charged with investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election, issued an indictment 1 of
twelve Russian intelligence officers in the hacking of the DNC and the Clinton campaign. It was
hoped that the indictment would have a deterrent effect and reduce the likelihood of future
attacks [54].
While vulnerabilities in election systems certainly remain, much has been done in the
United States to strengthen the cyber defenses. Before the 2018 midterms, 40 states invested
more than $75 million of federal and state funds to secure election systems after the 2016
election. This also includes 26 states that conducted security assessments and implemented
cybersecurity upgrades, 20 states that enhanced cybersecurity training for election officials, 15
states that upgraded voting equipment, and 9 states that expanded post-election audits [55].
While it is impossible to directly assess what impact, if any, the Mueller indictments had on
reducing foreign interference in the 2020 presidential, there is clear evidence that the cyber threat
was diminished. In late November 2020, Christopher Krebs, director of the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), claimed the election had been “the most secure in U.S.
history” and “there was no indication of evidence that there was any sort of hacking or
compromise of election systems on, before or after November 3” [56]. Krebs was subsequently
fired by President Trump for speaking out against his various assertions that the election had, in
fact, been stolen. Yet state, local and national election officials appear to have taken threats

1

This indictment detailed the accusation by the American government of the Russian government interference in the
2016 election. From https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download.
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manifested in the 2016 election seriously, implementing multiple security measures to ensure the
validity and integrity of the election process.
Direct cyber-attacks are far from the only means available to perpetrators of election
interference. Misinformation and disinformation can also undermine public confidence in the
election process. Ahead of the 2020 presidential election, CISA released a resource guide
designed to counter some of the more common rumors contributing to public concerns over
security of election infrastructure and related processes [57]. This CISA guide provides an indepth analysis of voting system processes in the United States and dispels numerous false
assertions, including suggestions that election software is not reviewed or tested beforehand.
CISA went further still, issuing a joint statement in November 2020 with the Elections
Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council and other groups. The collective opinion of this
consortium of experts on election integrity, as it applies to the 2020 presidential race, is that
recounts are to be expected when elections are close. The process has built-in redundancies
(e.g., paper ballots to back up votes cast electronically) that allow for the identification and
correction of any mistakes or errors [58]. CISA and its partners conclude that despite numerous
claims to the contrary, there was “no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes,
changed votes, or was in any way compromised” during the 2020 presidential election cycle
[58].
While the 2020 election was more secure than those of the past, in October 2020,
Trustwave, a global cybersecurity company, discovered a hacker was selling personally
identifying information on 186 million American voters. Much of the data was already publicly
available, but names, email addresses, and voter registration records were found for sale on the
dark web. While voter registration data is publicly available in most states, email addresses are
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often not included in that public data. The databases were listed for sale by "Greenmoon2019''
and potentially enabled malicious actors to target registered Democrats or Republicans through
email. Zid Mador, the vice president of security research at Trustwave, pointed out: “In the
wrong hands, this voter and consumer data can easily be used for geotargeted disinformation
campaigns over social media, email phishing and text and phone scams before, during and after
the election, especially if results are contested” [59].
While much of America’s attention was focused on securing the presidential election
system, one of the biggest known thefts of cybersecurity tools occurred. FireEye2, one of the
largest cybersecurity companies in the United States, announced on December 8, 2020, foreign
government hackers with "world-class capabilities" broke into their network and stole tools that
they use to test the defenses of thousands of customers including federal, state, and local
governments. FireEye partners with a wide range of insurance companies including Marsh,
Lockton, Beazley, and Sompo International. FireEye's CEO, Kevin Mandia, released in a
statement that the attacker "primarily sought information related to certain government
customers." Mandia also stated that he has concluded that the attack was completed by a nation
with "top-tier offensive capabilities” [60]. The motive behind the attack remains unclear.
Just five days after the FireEye attack was announced, a much larger attack on IT
monitoring and management software SolarWinds stole the headlines. SolarWinds clients
include many of the largest technology, telecommunications and consulting firms in the world—
along with many agencies of numerous national governments, including the United States. The
attacks on FireEye and SolarWinds led to a broader investigation as to whether the Russian
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FireEye is a publicly traded cybersecurity company (FEYE). On December 8, 2020 (the day the attack was
announced) the stock was trading at 15.52 and dropped to 13.49 on December 9th, representing a decrease of 13%.
From https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/FEYE/
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hackers had achieved in infiltrating both federal and private networks [61]. In a statement on
December 13, 2020, the Russian Embassy in Washington denied any involvement. If Russia’s
connection is confirmed in this attack, it will be “the most sophisticated known theft of American
government data since a two-year spree in 2014 and 2015, in which Russian intelligence
agencies gained access to the unclassified email systems at the White House, the State
Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It took years to undo the damage...” [61]. This
expansive hack could have long lasting potential effects on affected organizations.
There are a multitude of reasons as to why voting systems in the United States are
particularly vulnerable. In a New York Times article, “The Crisis of Election Security” the
susceptibility of America’s voting systems is analyzed through the past elections. It asks and
answers: “How did our election system get so vulnerable, and why haven’t officials tried harder
to fix it? The answer, ultimately, comes down to politics and money: The voting machines are
made by well-connected private companies that wield immense control over their proprietary
software, often fighting vigorously in court to prevent anyone from examining it when things go
awry” [62]. The risk of cyber-attacks to election infrastructure is not new. The history of Russian
theft alone of critical data from the U.S. government spans across more than two decades and
resulted in the creation of the United States Cyber Command, which is the Pentagon’s evolving
cyberwarfare force [61]. Then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, in a radio talk show interview
with Mark Levin said it was “pretty clear” that Russia was behind the security attack against the
United States in 2020. He also said that Russia was on the list of people who “want to undermine
our way of life, our republic, [and] our basic democratic principles… you see the news of the day
with respect to their efforts in cyberspace. We’ve seen this for an awfully long time, using
asymmetric capabilities to try and put themselves in a place where they can impose costs on the
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United States” [63]. It was not until three weeks after the realization of the attack that the United
States formally named Russia as the likely source in a joint statement issued by the FBI,
Department of Homeland Security, Director of National Intelligence, and National Security
Agency [64].
Election Security in Countries Outside the United States
Other countries are also plagued by cyber-attacks in election processes, often with
different vulnerabilities being targeted. Figure 7 displays statistics from a study in which 26
countries were asked about the likelihood and preparation for cyber-attacks on national security
information, public infrastructure, and elections in their country. A striking 74% of these
countries said that it was likely that their country’s sensitive national security information was
being accessed [65].
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Figure 7: Perceived Likelihood of Cyber-attacks within 26 Countries [65]
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"somewhat" likely and those who volunteer that such attacks have already happened.

Estonia was one of the first countries to be attacked in the first major act of cyber
warfare. In 2007, the Estonian government decided to move the Bronze Soldier, a symbol of
Soviet oppression. This decision led to protests which were exacerbated by false Russian news
reports that claimed the statue was being destroyed; when it was in reality being moved. In this
rioting, 156 people were injured, one person died, and 1,000 people were detained. Additionally,
the day after the physical destruction, cyber-attacks affected online services of Estonian banks,
media outlets, and government bodies. Also, a massive volume of spam email was sent by
botnets, generating large numbers of online requests and overloading servers. Estonians were
unable to use online banking services, government employees were unable to email, and
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newspapers could not deliver news [66]. Estonia faced lost productivity, opportunity cost,
remediation, and acquiring alternative web services at emergency rates that is estimated to have
cost billions of Euro [67]. Positively, this event transformed Estonia. Estonia was hit particularly
hard because it is heavily dependent on online processes and digital infrastructure. In 2008, it
was estimated that Estonia was “97% dependent on internet banking” [67]. This event was a
“wake-up call, helping Estonians become experts in cyber defense today” [66]. The country’s
leading IT experts are trained by the Ministry of Defense. The event helped to earn Estonia a
reputation today as a country with extremely strong cyber security. This example was one of the
first attacks on one nation by another. Russia has been involved in a multitude of hacks against
other nations including, most notably, the United States, Lithuania, and Kyrgyzstan [67].
Ten years later, in 2017, the French were able to successfully counter Russian electoral
interference. Two days before the final round of the French presidential elections, data hacked
from Emmanuel Macron’s presidential campaign team were released online. Nearly 14.5
gigabytes of emails and personal and business documents were posted to the site Pastebin
through links to more than 70,000 files. Officials from Macron’s party said that the attackers
mixed fake documents and authentic ones to create confusion and misinformation. One of the
reasons the hack was unsuccessful was the speed at which the issue was addressed. Throughout
the campaign, the susceptibility to hacking was communicated openly and all hacking attempts
were made public. This attempt was announced within a few hours. Additionally, a few hours
after the documents were released online, the French mandated period of 48 hours of reflection
prior to an election, where the media and campaigns are silent, began. This ‘blackout’ period of
mainstream media, which the United States does not implement, helped to make the attempt
unsuccessful at deterring popular opinion of the elect. France was able to anticipate, react, and
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coordinate its response between the Macron campaign staff, the government, and civil society
[68].
Misinformation and Disinformation
Democratic elections rely heavily on faith in the electoral process. Therefore, the
deliberate introduction and spread of false information can increase voter confusion and devalue
a fact-based political debate. In recent years, social media has been the platform of choice for
disrupting elections through the dissemination of both misinformation and disinformation,
though other electronic methods exist—including ordinary email. The result is a blurring of lines
between truth and fiction. The difference between misinformation and disinformation is
important and is based on intention. Misinformation occurs when false information is spread,
regardless of the intent to mislead [69]. Disinformation is the “deliberate generation and
dissemination of false information to manipulate public opinion and perceptions…” The rapid
spread of misinformation and disinformation online has led many organizations to strengthen
cyber security safeguards [70].
Today, most major social media platforms invest heavily in content screening, including
political content. After the 2016 presidential election, Facebook hired thousands of third-party
moderators located in the Philippines, India, Dublin, and the United States to help bolster their
reputation. There is currently a debate as to whether content moderation is best carried out by
humans or largely through the use of artificial intelligence (AI). Mary Gray, a senior principal
researcher at Microsoft Research warned “They [Facebook] haven’t made enough leaps and
bounds in artificial intelligence to take away the best tool we have: human intelligence to do the
discernment” [71]. While AI technology is increasingly reliable and is more efficient from a cost
perspective, overdependence on it can increase the risk of false information spreading across
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social media. Forms of disinformation vary and quickly evolve. The deception involved in
disinformation is similar to that of phishing. Facebook had nearly 15,000 contractors at 20 sites
globally hired to remove pornography, hate speech, terrorism, and other unwanted content from
its site. The screening process works to detect deception and misinformation. Due to the
coronavirus pandemic, Facebook in 2020 sent home thousands of these human moderators. The
social network must now rely more on technology to protect against misinformation [71].
Facebook along with other companies, such as Twitter, have used artificial intelligence and
algorithms, but have recognized that humans are vital to removing some of the content. The
pressure to combat misinformation regarding a multitude of subjects, including the integrity of
the 2020 general election in the United State and the COVID-19 pandemic, is high.
Overall, there does not need to be a cyber-attack in order to disrupt through online
platforms. Misinformation and disinformation can be particularly dangerous to elections, because
they can threaten democracy by spreading deceit. Disinformation campaigns are a means of
interfering with campaigns digitally which undermines confidence in democracies. Lastly,
disinformation can damage trust in the media.
Reliability of Online Content
Liability associated with content has evolved due to election integrity. With a multitude
of platforms and many posts, it can be difficult to decipher the validity of information spread
about Candidates. Recently there has been debate over whether Section 230, which helps
platforms to moderate posts, should still be upheld. This provision is known as the “twenty-six
words that created the internet.” Created back in 1996, Section 230 was enacted as a part of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). Section 230 was originally created after a court ruling
against the online platform Prodigy. In this case, Prodigy argued that it was not responsible for
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its users’ speech, but the court treated Prodigy more like a publisher because they moderate some
of their users’ posts. While being treated like a publisher, a platform would be legally liable for
misleading or harmful content it ‘publishes’ [72]. Section 230 allowed for companies to
moderate material on their platforms without being treated like a publisher under law. It says:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” [73]. Therefore,
platforms cannot be held liable for what users post.
The COVID-19 pandemic caused content to be moderated more closely. Prior to the
pandemic, misinformation was generally political in nature and was not known to not cause
immediate harm. False information relating to the Coronavirus, could however, cause direct
harm. Posts claiming the virus was a hoax may have undermined the credibility of public
responses that were necessary to slow the spread of the virus and might have encouraged people
to ignore warnings and gather in groups [74]. As a result, platforms adopted stricter moderation
policies toward COVID-19 misinformation. In addition to COVID-19, political speech made
Section 230 one of the most discussed topics of 2020. Donald Trump and other republicans have
accused tech companies of censoring conservatives. Some have argued that Big Tech has gained
too much control. Two days after the 2021 storming of the United States Capital on January 6th,
Twitter suspended President Trump from its platform permanently. Social media companies have
long been tested by President Trump who violated Twitter’s policy against the glorification of
violence [75]. Twitter’s announcement said that “After close review of recent Tweets from the
@realDonaldTrump account and the context around them we have permanently suspended the
account due to the risk of further incitement of violence” 3. Facebook and Instagram also
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https://twitter.com/twittersafety/status/1347684877634838528
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temporarily suspended Trump’s account. Regarding Section 230, tech leaders of Twitter, Jack
Dorsey, and Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, said they are open to revising the legislation [76].
Twitter and Facebook have said their platforms balance between promoting free expression and
removing harmful content [76]. Democrats, including Joe Biden, have also spoken on the subject
of Section 230, urging Congress to revise it to help remove hate speech, election interference,
and false information.
The debated question is: should these platforms be held liable for the content it holds?
Both parties push for revision of the act, yet for different reasons. Jen Kosseff, an assistant
professor of cybersecurity law in the U.S. Naval Academy’s Cyber Science Department, said “it
would be challenging for Congress to reach consensus on how to alter Section 230” [76]. He also
mentioned it would be challenging to satisfy everyone who is upset with the big tech companies.
Repealing Section 230 would ultimately lead to more moderation, because of the increased risk
of liability of the content that users post.
COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated a major shift—already underway prior to the
pandemic—toward a more digitized workforce and world in general. Many employees are
working from home and relying on emails and other platforms to communicate with co-workers
and customers. The increased reliance on digital communications technologies increases the
probability of both malicious attacks and unintentional breaches. Consistent with the increased
vulnerability, the FBI has reported a 400 percent increase in cyber-attacks post-COVID [77],
demonstrating beyond any doubt that malicious actors are exploiting an exponential increase in
the attack surface. Heightened awareness of cyber threats even before COVID was already
driving demand for cyber insurance sharply upward. A Zurich Insurance and Advisen Ltd. study
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reported that the proportion of companies (all sizes) purchasing coverage grew from 34 percent
in 2011 to around 80 percent in 2020 [77]. Smaller businesses, however, appear less aware,
willing or able to mitigate the financial consequences of cyber-attacks through the purchase of
insurance. According to the 2020 CyberScout survey, “64 percent of U.S. SMBs (small and midsized businesses) reported not having cyber insurance coverage for their business and 5 percent
didn’t know if they have any cyber coverage in their current policy” [78] (See Figure 8). Despite
a sharp increase in cyber-attacks aimed at employees working from home—especially
ransomware attacks—the reasons why most SMBs continue to lack cyber insurance coverage
remains unclear. This disconnect may be attributed to the lack of knowledge and cost. In the
future of digital work, business plans must prioritize cyber risk as a top business liability.
Figure 8: Small Businesses with Cyber Policies [78]

36%
Covered

Not Covered
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Vaccine Vulnerabilities: A Complex Supply Chain
With respect to the Covid-19 vaccine, criminals will likely try to interrupt the
distribution. The COVID-19 supply chain is extremely vulnerable to hackers and other cyber
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security issues, such as ransomware attacks on hospitals and pharmacies. The international police
organization, Interpol, in early December 2020 issued a Global Orange Notice, which is a serious
and imminent threat to public safety [79]. The Interpol secretary general warned: “As
governments are preparing to roll out vaccines, criminal organizations are planning to infiltrate
or disrupt supply chains” [80]. This has been seen within the first few weeks of distribution.
IBM’s cybersecurity division found that a series of cyber-attacks were underway that aimed at
the companies and government organizations distributing the coronavirus vaccines [81].
According to the IBM X-Force report, a global phishing campaign targeted organizations within
the COVID-19 “cold chain” began as early as September 2020. This cold chain refers to the step
of the vaccine supply chain that ensures preservation of the vaccines in a temperature-controlled
environment during both storage and transportation [82]. Nick Rossmann, who leads IBM’s
global threat intelligence teams, said that the cyber-attacks “were working to get access to how
the vaccine is shipped, stored, kept cold, and delivered” [81]. This attack emphasizes the need
for cybersecurity diligence at each step of the vaccine supply chain.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of cyber risk in the past 25 years has caused the risk to become extremely
prevalent in today’s society creating an increasingly sophisticated market for cyber insurance.
Companies are increasingly dependent on technology, which increases their exposure to cyber
threats. Multiple factors affect the risks that corporations face. Three of the most afflicted sectors
of cyber risk were analyzed: healthcare, transportation, and electoral systems. Risk mitigation
continues to be the goal of corporations, with an increasing focus on cyber risk. One of the most
important aspects of mitigating cyber risk will be awareness. As businesses become more
connected and interdependent on technology, they become more vulnerable to these types of
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attacks. I foresee the next wave of cyber risk will be pertaining to personal medical data being
held by the companies creating apps for vaccine passports4. With an ever-changing world that is
constantly evolving technologically, there will always be cyber risks. Cyber insurance coverage
needs to be part of every policy. I hope that companies and organizations are preparing for the
future by implementing technologies to enhance cyber resilience.
Cyber insurance coverage should be part of a company’s multifaceted defense strategy
against cyber risks. Some other defenses that should be implemented include Multi-factor
Authentication (MFA), password protection, data encryption, and employee awareness training.
I would lastly like to thank my director, Dr. Robert Hartwig, for his outstanding role in
guiding me through this research and writing process. I would also like to thank my second
reader, Gregory Niehaus, for his time and expertise during this process.
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Ideas on vaccination passport apps currently remain uncertain. An analog approach that does not need an app to
work would be more accessible, cheaper, and more privacy concerning. A semi-digital approach (that EU is
currently considering), with the use of paper records that are verifiable by QR code, could be hacked. From
https://www.govtech.com/security/vaccination-passport-apps-could-help-society-reopen--first-they-have-to-besecure-private-and-trusted.html
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Appendix I: Healthcare
Entity, Date, and
Type of Attack

Summary

Records Lost

Financial
Loss/Impact

Resolution (date)

Adjustments to Cyber Risk
Management
Anthem provided free credit
monitoring and identity
protection services to all who
were affected for up to two
years.
The insurer has enhanced its
monitoring and alerting
software. Dominion National
reported the security incident to
the FBI. All of the patients
received two years of credit and
fraud protection services.

Anthem Blue
Cross Blue Shield
1/29/15
Type: Data
Breach
Dominion
National
6/1/2019
Type: Medical
Data breach

An unknown hacker accessed a database that had personal
information such as names, birthdays, social security
numbers, addresses, emails, and income information [83].

78.8 million
policyholders'
personal
information

Lawsuit of
$115 M

Anthem paid out $115 M
to settle lawsuits (June
2017).

An internal alert notified Dominion National of unauthorized
access to computer servers that breached data from as early
as August 2010. This data varied, but included names, Social
Security numbers, taxpayer identification numbers, bank
account and routing numbers, member ID numbers, group
numbers, subscriber numbers, addresses, and email addresses
[84].

2.96 million
patient's
personal
information

Class Action
Lawsuit (on
going) filed by
Tousley Brain
Stephens for
the negligent
handling of the
data.

Individuals were notified
(investigation ended
April 2019).

Wolverine
Solutions Group
9/23/18
Type:
Ransomware
Attack

Ransomware encrypted files that contained protected health
data. The attack is believed to have started with the
download of the Emotet Trojan, which has been used in
several attacks. The exposed information includes names,
addresses, dates of birth, social security numbers, insurance
contract information and numbers, phone numbers, and
medical information [85].
In October of 2018, Accudoc informed that an unauthorized
party gained access to Accudoc's third party vendor,
AccuDoc Solutions in late September. Impacted information
included names, addresses, dates of birth, social security
numbers, etc. [86].

600,000
patients

Wolverine issued
notifications to affected
individuals (notified by
March 2019).

Affected patients received free
access to credit monitoring and
identity theft protection services.

2.65 Million
individuals

Individuals were notified
(starting October 2018).

Accudoc brought on a forensic
firm to help secure its database.
They also contacted the FBI.
Those whose SSNs were
exposed were offered free credit
monitoring and identity
protection services.

MSK Group discovered that its computer networks
experienced a security event. After investigation, they did not
believe records containing personal information were
removed from the computer network; however, there was
unauthorized access to the network that stored personal
information such as driver's licenses, SSNs, insurance, and
medical information [87].

566,000
patients [88].

Individuals were notified
(approximately July 9,
2018).

Offered individuals one year of
free identify theft protection
services.

AccuDoc
Solutions, Inc.
(third party
vendor of Atrium
Health)
9/22/18
Type: Hacking/IT
Incident
MSK Group
5/7/18
Type: Hacking/IT
Incident
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Entity, Date, and
Type of Attack
Piedmont Cancer
Institute, P.C.
9/15/20
Type: Email
phishing

UnityPoint
3/2020- 5/2020
Type: Email
phishing

Community
Health Systems,
Inc.
August 2014
Type: Malware
attack

Banner Health
6/17/16
Type:
Cybersecurity
attack

Summary

Records Lost

The institute began notifying over 5,000 patients in
September 2020 that their personal health information was
exposed during an email phishing incident. An unauthorized
individual gained access to a Piedmont Cancer's employee
email account between April 5 and May 8. Personal
information that was exposed includes names, birthdays,
financial account information, and debit and credit card
information [89].
The health system's email system was hit by a series of
targeted phishing emails that appeared to be sent from an
executive within UnityPoint. An employee fell for the email
thereby giving hackers access to internal email accounts from
March 14 to April 3, 2018. It was found that the hackers
were likely attempting to divert vendor or payroll payments.
The hacked accounts' data that was exposed included names,
addresses, medical data, treatment information, lab results,
insurance information, payment cards, and SSNs [90].
Attackers used a sophisticated malware to bypass
Community Health System's Security and was able to copy
and transfer information out of the system. The compromised
information included names, addresses, birthdays, phone
numbers, and SSNs [91].

5226 patients

Banner reported that their computer servers and systems that
process payment card data at certain Banner Health food and
beverage outlets were affected in the attack. The attack was
targeting payment card data including cardholder names,
card numbers, expiration dates and internal verification
codes. For the providers: names, addresses, birthdays, Tax
identification numbers, National Provider Identifier numbers,
and SSNs were affected in the data breach [93].

Financial
Loss/Impact

Resolution (date)

Adjustments to Cyber Risk
Management

Individuals were notified
(September 2020).

Piedmont implemented
multifactor authentication across
its emails and added additional
security awareness training.

1.4 Million
patients

$2.8 million
dollar
settlement

The settlement provided
the breach victims with
monetary relief,
including 1 year of
comprehensive credit
monitoring and identify
theft protection services
(June 2020).

UnityPoint reset the passwords
to the compromised accounts,
added phishing education for
employees, added secure tools to
identify suspicious emails, and
implemented multi-factor
authentication.

6.2 Million
patients

$5 million
lawsuit
settlement

CHS agreed to "implement and
maintain a comprehensive
information security program” to
prevent future security failure.

3.6 Million
individuals

$8.9 million
lawsuit
settlement [94]

According to Iowa's
Attorney General, CHS
failed to implement
reasonable security
practices. They faced a
six-year lawsuit relating
to this wrongdoing
(October 2020) [92].
Lawsuit was due to
victims claiming that
Banner failed to
thoroughly investigate
and harden their systems
against risks (April
2020).

Banner claimed to be enhancing
the security of its systems.
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Entity, Date, and
Type of Attack

Summary

ABCD Pediatrics
2/6/2017
Type:
Ransomware
attack

ABCD Pediatrics discovered that someone gained
unauthorized access to its servers and used ransomware to
encrypt data. The attack involved a ransomware called
Dharma. The encryption process was stopped by the antivirus solution used by ABCD Pediatrics, isolating the
affected servers and taking them offline. The type of
information that was potentially compromised includes
patients' names, addresses, phone numbers, demographic
information, SSNs, insurance billing information, and
medical records [95].
An investigator found that clients' personal information was
publicly available on the internet from July 2015 to February
2018 [96].

55,447
patients
impacted

N/A

Individuals were
notified; impacted
individuals received
credit monitoring and
identity theft protection
services for one year
(notified after March
2018).

The investigation found the
source of the attack and
additional security solutions such
as state-of-the-art network cyber
monitoring were added to
ABCD's security measures.

3,751 clients

$200,000
penalty to the
state

The Arc of Erie County
announced that it will review its
policies and analyze its
vulnerabilities of all electronic
equipment and data systems.

A criminal group that is believed to be located in Eastern
Europe obtained the log in credentials of a vendor that
provides hardware for one of the information systems used
by the hospital. SamSam malware was used to encrypt data
files associated with this system. Messages appeared on the
hospital PC screens saying that the system was encrypted
using SamSam ransomware, it also demanded a payment be
made within seven days or there would be permanent
encryption of the data. The CEO decided to pay the ransom
of four bitcoin to retrieve the private encryption keys. It
appears patient data was not transferred outside of the
hospital's network [97].

N/A purpose
was to obtain
a ransom
payment, not
take patient
data

4 Bitcoin in
ransom

In Match, 2018, clients
were formally notified.
They were provided with
a one-year subscription
to LifeLock to protect
against identity theft.
The case was handled by
the Bureau of Internet
and Technology Deputy
Bureau Chief, Clark
Russell. The Arc of Erie
County paid $200,00 in
fees for violating
HIPAA (August 2018).
Friday evening, Hancock
paid the four-bitcoin
transaction to receive the
private keys from the
attackers. Critical
systems were restored by
Monday (1/14/2018).

Arc of Erie
County (Nonprofit)
7/2015-2/2018
Type: Breach of
client information

Hancock Health
Hospital
1/11/2018
Type:
Ransomware
attack

Records Lost

Financial
Loss/Impact

Resolution (date)

Adjustments to Cyber Risk
Management

Hancock validated that the files
were safely recovered, encrypted
files were deleted, and
information systems were
brought back online.
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Entity, Date, and
Type of Attack

Summary

Records Lost

Financial
Loss/Impact

21st Century
Oncology
10/3/201512/13/2015
Type: Data breach

It was discovered by the FBI that an unauthorized individual
accessed and stole information from one of their patient
databases. It was accessed by a Remote Desktop Protocol
from an exchange server that contained protected health
information of over two million individuals [98].

2,213,597
individuals

$2.3 milliondollar
settlement

Inmediata Health
Group
January 2019
Type: Web
exposure data
breach

Officials discovered that some electronic health information
was left online that was exposed y a webpage that allowed
search engines to index Inmediata's internal webpages. The
webpage was then deactivated, and the compromised data
was found to include patient names, addresses, birthdays,
gender, and medical claims data. There was no evidence of
copying or saving of the files [99].

1.56 million
patients
impacted

Facing class
action
investigations

Mayfield Clinic
February 2016
Type:
Ransomware
emails

Patients of the Mayfield Clinic of Cincinnati were sent an
email that contained an attachment which downloaded
ransomware onto the patients' devices. The victims were told
they needed to pay a ransom to unlock the encryption. No
personal or medical data was accessed, just the emails.
Mayfield was able to alert many of the people on the email
list the same day [101].

23,000
patients

Universal Health
Services
September 2020
Type:
Ransomware
attack

Universal Health Services experienced a ransomware attack
on September 27. This attack locked computers and phone
systems across UHS facilities in the United States. The
suspected cybercriminals use a strain of ransomware known
as Ryuk. This attack forced doctors and nurses to rely on
paper and pencil for record keeping, which slowed lab work.
Chaotic conditions were described [102].

All United
States sites
were
impacted;
Electronic
medical
records were
not directly
impacted

$67 million
[103]

Resolution (date)

Adjustments to Cyber Risk
Management

21st Century Oncology
agreed to pay the Human
Services’ Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) $2.3
million and to adopt a
corrective plan of action
to bring its policies up to
standards of HIPAA
(December 2017).
Individuals were emailed
beginning April 22,
2019. It was found that
there were mailing
mistakes, and some
patients claimed to
receive multiple letters
addressed to other
patients (ongoing
lawsuits) [100].
Mayfield used a
computer virus
protection service, and
all recipients of the
email were sent
information to download
software to remove the
ransomware virus
(February 2016).
The systems were
quickly disconnected,
and the network was
shut down to prevent
further destruction. The
UHS IT Network was
restored (10/5/2020).

21st Century Oncology agreed to
adopt a corrective action plan
that included revising its policies
and procedures or reporting
violations of HIPAA rules, and
training staff on the new
policies, and conducting an
organization-wide risk
assessment.
The company has implemented
new server and database
procedures, as well as additional
security to avoid future incidents
of similar nature.

Mayfield assessed its controls
and provided anti-scanning
updates to employee emails. It
also discontinued the distribution
of electronic newsletters.

The recovery and restoration
process were enacted by UHG,
no other future plans were
explicitly announced.
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Appendix II: Transportation sector
Entity, Date, and
Type of Attack

Summary

Records Lost

EasyJet
May 2020
Type: Cyberattack

EasyJet (a low-cost airline based in England) was the target
of a "highly sophisticated" cyberattack which exposed the
email addresses and travel plans of about 9 million
customers. Around 2,000 of the customers had their credit
card details stolen [104].

9 million
customers

British Airways
June 2018
Type: Data breach

A variety of information was compromised including log in
information, payment cards, and travel booking details of
about 500,000 customers [105].

500,000
customers’
information

Lufthansa
4/1/2015
Type: Cyber
attack

Hackers used a botnet to decipher customer login credentials
used for the airline's online portal. Hackers then made
purchases using miles on users' frequent flyer accounts.
According to Lufthansa, the damage was limited to a few
hundred accounts. The miles and travel vouchers that were
stolen were returned to their owners. Lufthansa's IT
department identified fraudulent activity and discovered
'Bots' trying to use usernames and passwords until obtaining
the right combinations [38].

Several
Hundred
customer
pages

Financial
Loss/Impact

Resolution (date)

Adjustments to Cyber Risk
Management

UK's
Information
Commissioner's
Office (ICO) is
investigating
whether the
airline had
properly
protected the
personal data of
its customers.
This will likely
result in a heavy
fine.
20 million
pound fine
($25.9M) from
the UK's
Information
Commissioner’s
Office (ICO) for
failing to protect
personal
customer
information.
N/A

The company contacted
individuals affected by
the end of May 2020.

The airline got in contact with
the National Cyber Security
Centre, a British organization
that helps companies avoid
computer security threats and
the Information
Commissioner’s Office
(British agency that reviews
data breaches).

The 183 million pound
fine from the ICO was
reduced to 20m due to
the airline's financial
circumstances. The
investigators found that
British Airways had
failed to put sufficient
security measures in
place to protect its
customer's data (7/2019).
For the accounts
affected, Lufthansa has
reimbursed them and
changed the account
numbers and contacted
members to change their
usernames and
passwords (April 2015)
[106].

British airways planned to
make improvements to the
security of their systems since
the attack.

The account information of
all customers was changed.
No other risk mitigation plan
was explicitly mentioned.
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Entity, Date, and
Type of Attack

Summary

San Francisco
Municipal
Transportation
Agency (SFMTA)
April 2015
Type:
Ransomware
attack

On Black Friday 2016, a cryptic message blocked access to
SFTMA's computer screens reading "You hacked, ALL Data
Encrypted." The hacker's goal was to obtain 100 bitcoins
($73,000) from SFTMA for the release of its symptoms. The
malware infected about 1/4 of SFTMA's computer systems
and gained access to physical ticketing machines. SFTMA
was forced to give free rides to passengers that weekend, and
the bus drivers resorted to hand-written routes. SFTMA
denied paying the ransom and restored the systems on their
own. By Sunday, the systems were restored [107].

2,000 of
SFTMA's
8,000
computer
systems

Agency
expected loss
was
approximately
$599,000 each
day SFMTA
was unable to
collect fares.

Keolis in Boston
10/10/2020
Type:
Ransomware
attack

Hackers obtained personal information from workers for the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA)
commuter rail operator, Keolis, and posted it online to
attempt to blackmail the company. Keolis took the systems
that were affected offline, notified law enforcement, and took
steps to restore the systems [109].
In 2015, LOT Polish Airlines suffered a DDoS attack which
caused the airline's computers to crash. It also destroyed its
flight plan IT system. This resulted in a 5-hour disruption
that saw 10 flight cancellations, 12 flight delays, and 1,400
passengers grounded. Flights midair were luckily unaffected
[38].

Amount of
employee data
released not
disclosed.

N/A

1,400 airline
passengers
grounded
[39].

N/A

LOT Polish
Airlines
June 2015
Type: Distributed
Denial of Service
(DDoS) Attack

Records Lost

Financial
Loss/Impact

Resolution (date)

Adjustments to Cyber Risk
Management

By Sunday the computer
systems were restored,
and an official statement
was released: "Transit
service was unaffected
and there were no
impacts to the safe
operation of buses and
Muni Metro. Neither
customer privacy nor
transaction information
were compromised. The
situation is now
contained, and we have
prioritized restoring our
systems to be fully
operational”
(11/27/2016) [108].
For impacted employees,
Keolis provided credit
monitoring and identity
theft protection (October
2020).

Not explicitly stated in
prevention of future attackers
obtaining this information. It
was mentioned that SFMTA
would reach out to staff to
remind them of the impacts of
clicking on links and opening
emails from unfamiliar
sources.

No direct access to the
data was obtained. The
passengers affected flew
on later flights or were
put up in hotels by LOT
(June 2015).

Thee chief executive
emphasized “This is an
industry problem on a much
wider scale, and for sure we
have to give it more
attention” [39].

Not explicitly mentioned.

68

Entity, Date, and
Type of Attack

Summary

Records Lost

Financial
Loss/Impact

Resolution (date)

Adjustments to Cyber Risk
Management

TFI declined to
comment further on the
ransomware attack
themselves. They said
"We continue to meet
most customer shipping
needs, and we are not
aware of any misuse of
client information. Out
of an abundance of
caution we want to make
our clients aware of the
incident, should you be
experiencing any issues
(August 2020).
There were many
workarounds to keep
business going. After
two weeks, business was
back to normal (June
2017).
About 5 days after the
incident, Cosco
announced in a customer
advisory from its
Shanghai headquarters
that "its network
applications in the
Americas had been fully
recovered” (7/30/2018)
[111].
In August, TNT resolved
to using WhatsApp for
internal communication
due to the email system
still be inaccessible.
Customer volumes were
restored to expected
levels (September 2017).

Not explicitly mentioned
other than making the clients
aware of the incident.

TFI subsidiary
Canpar Express
August 2020
Type:
Ransomware
attack

Files were stolen from TFI International's Canpar Express
and leaked onto the dark web after a ransomware attack
targeted this Canadian trucking and logistic company's
courier subsidiaries. The ransom was not paid, and TFI was
able to operate normally after a few days [110].

The leak
consisted of
three
documents,
and the
company’s
four parcel
and courier
subsidiaries
reported being
targeted in the
ransomware
attacks.

The data release
suggested that
TFI likely
decided not to
pay the ransom.

Maersk
June 2017
Type: Malware
attack

In early April, Maersk was hit by a worm named NotPetya,
which locked access to systems that the company uses to
operate shipping terminals worldwide. No data was lost, and
ships operated normally throughout the period the systems
were down. Although, for up to two days, the affected
terminals could not move cargo [46].
On July 24, 2018, a cyber-attack took place on the shipping
agency's digital assets affecting communication in the
American region. This affected the carrier’s ability to
communicate with vessels, customers, and marine terminals
[45].

Temporary
shutdown of
the Port of
Los Angeles'
largest cargo
terminal.
Systems in
U.S, Canada,
Panama,
Argentina,
Brazil, Peru,
Chile, and
Uruguay were
disabled in the
attack.

$200-$300
million.

A subsidiary of Fed Ex, TNT Express fell victim to the Petya
cyber-attack. TNT's operations in Europe were disrupted by
the attack causing significant financial loss due to lowerthan-expected results in first quarter earnings [112].

No breach or
data loss
occurred, but
the company
may not be
able to
recover all of
the systems
affected in the
attack.

$300 million

COSCO Shipping
7/24/2018
Type: Cyber
attack

FedEx
June 2017
Type: Petya cyber
attack

Caused a loss of
$250-$300
million.

The attack was able to exploit
technological, procedural, and
behavioral weaknesses for
Maersk to improve upon.

Cosco mentioned it would
conduct its operations via
remote access, to ensure
uninterrupted service to the
Americas.

They mentioned the plan to
instill confidence with
customers so that they can
fully meet their expectations.
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Entity, Date, and
Type of Attack
BMW
December 2019
Type: Cyber
attack

Summary

OceanLotus (aka APT32), believed to be a Vietnam-backed
group that targets threats, targeted BMW in 2019. This
software installed a Cobalt Strike testing tool to remotely spy
on machines. The hackers were blocked in December 2019.
The attackers did not breach the central data center in
Munich, Germany [113].

Records Lost

No sensitive
data was
leaked.

Financial
Loss/Impact
N/A

Resolution (date)
BMW’s cybersecurity
team was able to notice
the attack and carefully
monitor the group’s
activity, before kicking
out the attackers in
December.

Adjustments to Cyber Risk
Management
BMW made a general
statement saying, "We have
implemented structures and
processes that minimize the
risk of unauthorized external
access to our systems and
allow us to quickly detect,
reconstruct, and recover in the
event of an incident"
(December 2019) [113].

Appendix III: Election Sector
Entity, Date,
and Type of
Attack
Donald Trump’s
Campaign
October 2020
Type: Cyber
attack

Summary

It was discovered that Trump's campaign website was
hacked. Hackers claimed to have compromised multiple
devices which gained them access to "internal and secret
conversations of the president" and classified information.
The hackers were seeking cryptocurrency. The site visitors
were invited to donate cryptocurrency to two different funds:
one labeled "Yes, share the data" and the other "No, do not
share the data". The payments solicited were in Monero,
which is a difficult to trace cryptocurrency. The message also
said, "After the deadline, we will compare funds and execute
the will of the world." Tim Murtaugh, a spokesman for the
Trump campaign, confirmed that there was no exposure of
sensitive data because none of it is stored on the site [114].

Records Lost

Financial Loss/Impact

N/A; website
was restored

N/A

Resolution (date)

The website was
restored, and the
Trump campaign said
they were working
with law enforcement
authorities to
investigate the source
of the attack (October
2020).

Adjustments to Cyber
Risk Management
Intelligence agencies
closely monitored
hacking groups that
may attempt to break
into election-related
systems.
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Entity, Date,
and Type of
Attack
Hillary Clinton’s
Campaign
April 2016
Type: Phishing
attack

Summary

Records Lost

Financial Loss/Impact

Hackers created a fake email account to send phishing emails
to over 30 Clinton staffers. The emails included a link that
directed to a document titled "hillaryclinton-favorablerating.xlsx". This led to a website operated by the hackers.
The hackers were able to use stolen credentials to access the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee network,
stealing data [53].

They accessed
33 DNC
computers and
registered for
a website
called DC
leaks to
publicize the
documents.

N/A

Trustwave
October 2020
Type: Cyber
attack

Trustwave, a global cybersecurity company, says a hacker
was selling information on 186 million U.S. voters. Much of
the data is publicly available, but names, email addresses,
and voter registration records were found for sale on the dark
web. While voter registration data is publicly available in
most states, email addresses are often not a part of the public
data. The databases were listed for sale by "Greenmoon2019"
which would allow for malicious acts by targeting email
addresses of only registered Democrats or only registered
Republicans [59].

186 million
U.S. voter
records and
245 million
records of
other personal
data

N/A

FireEye
12/8/2020
Type:
Cyberespionage

One of the largest cybersecurity companies in the United
States, FireEye, said that on Tuesday, December 8th, foreign
government hackers with "world-class capabilities" broke
into their network and stole tools that they use to test the
defenses of thousands of customers including federal, state,
and local governments. FireEye's CEO, Kevin Mandia,
released in a statement that the attacker "primarily sought
information related to certain government customers."
Mandia also stated that he has concluded that the attack was
completed by a nation with "top-tier offensive capabilities"
[60].

Accessed
certain Red
Team
assessment
tools used to
test customer
security

Potential loss of
customers. Stock price
went down after the
reveal of the attacks.

Resolution (date)

The counsel
investigating Russian
interference in the
2016 election issued
an indictment of 12
Russian intelligence
officers in the hacking
of the Democratic
National Committee
and the Clinton
Campaign (July 2018)
[54].
Trustwave said in a
statement that they are
committed to
investigating fraud
during the election.
They assured that the
FBI is closely working
with their federal,
state, and local
partners to safeguard
the voting process
(October 2020).
FireEye is
investigating the
attack with the FBI
and Microsoft Corp.
They are publishing
information that can
help to neutralize the
tools that were stolen
(December 2020 and
ongoing) [115].

Adjustments to Cyber
Risk Management
They worked with the
FBI to safeguard the
electoral voting
process.

Working with FBI to
safeguard the electoral
voting process.

FireEye is working to
innovate and adapt to
protect customers from
threat actors.
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Entity, Date,
and Type of
Attack
Obama and
McCain
presidential
campaigns
2008
Type:
Cyberespionage
through a
phishing attack

Emmanuel
Macron's
campaign
May 2017
Type:
Cyberattack
(releasing data
and spreading
disinformation)

Summary

Records Lost

Financial Loss/Impact

Resolution (date)

The United States traced the massive cyberespionage
operation against the 2008 presidential campaigns of Barack
Obama and John McCain back to the People's Republic of
China. The goal of the campaign intrusion was to export
internal data from both campaigns, including internal
position papers and private emails to gain leverage with the
winner of the election. The intrusion into the campaign's
computer networks continued for months after first being
detected by the FBI in the summer of 2008. The attack was
delivered by a "phishing" email that contained an attachment
with sophisticated malware that infiltrated throughout the
Obama campaign's computer system [49].

A large
number of
internal files
were
compromised

Theft of intellectual
property costs the U.S.
money. A report from
the former Intelligence
Director Blair and the
former U.S.
Ambassador to China
estimated this theft
(mostly from China) to
be costing the U.S.
around $300 billion per
year.

Two days before the final round of the French presidential
elections, data hacked from Macron’s presidential campaign
team were released online. Nearly 14.5 gigabytes of emails,
personal and business documents were posted to the site
Pastebin through links to more than 70,000 files. Officials
from Macron’s party said that the attackers mixed fake
documents and authentic ones to create confusion and
misinformation [116].

14.5 gigabytes
of documents
and emails

N/A

The campaign
dispatched a computer
security team from
Kroll Advisory
Solutions to Chicago
to cleanse the infected
computers. Chinese
officials have denied
any role in cyberattacks against the
U.S. government and
private enterprise
(2013) [49].
The attack failed to
influence the electoral
process. Macron still
won the election.
Factors such as
anticipation and
reaction by the
Macron campaign
staff, government, and
civil society and
mainstream media can
be attributed to
resisting the attempted
Russian influence
(May 2017) [68].

Adjustments to Cyber
Risk Management
More cyber security
measures were taken
and improved upon
since this attack.

The increase of further
prevention of
"information
laundering" in the
media due to the
resilience of the French
media environment
[68].
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Entity, Date,
and Type of
Attack
Estonian
Government
April 2007
Type: Cyberattack and
disinformation

Summary

Records Lost

Financial Loss/Impact

In 2007, the Estonian government decided to move the
Bronze Soldier, a symbol of Soviet oppression. This decision
led to protests which were exacerbated by false Russian news
reports that claimed the statue was being destroyed. In this
rioting, 156 people were injured, one person died, and 1,000
people were detained. The day after the physical destruction,
cyber-attacks affected online services of Estonian banks,
media outlets, and government bodies. The massive spam
that was sent by botnets generated large amounts of online
requests, overloading servers. Estonians were unable to use
online banking services, government employees were unable
to email, and newspapers could not deliver news. The attacks
came from Russian IP addresses and Russian language was
used. The attacks continued until May 19, 2007 [67].

Estonian
governmental,
political, and
financial
websites and
e-services
were targeted.

Estonia faced lost
productivity,
opportunity cost,
remediation, and
acquiring alternative
web services at
emergency rates are
estimated to have cost
billions of Euro.

Resolution (date)

Adjustments to Cyber
Risk Management

The attacks ceased on
May 19, 2007. In
January 2008, the
Estonian government
indicted one of the
responsible hackers
(5/19/2007) [67].

In May 2008, the
Estonian Ministry of
Defense implemented a
National Cyber
Security Strategy [66].
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